One contribution of 15 to a theme issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions' .
Heisenberg offered an interpretation of the quantum state which made use of a quantitative version of an earlier notion, δύναμις, of Aristotle by both referring to it using its Latin name, potentia, and identifying its qualitative aspect with δύναμις. The relationship between this use and Aristotle's notion was not made by Heisenberg in full detail, beyond noting their common character: that of signifying the system's objective capacity to be found later to possess a property in actuality. For such actualization, Heisenberg required measurement to have taken place, an interaction with external systems that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system. The notion of state actualization was later taken up by others, including Shimony, in the search for a law-like measurement process. Yet, the relation of quantum potentiality to Aristotle's original notion has been viewed as mainly terminological, even by those who used it thus. Here, I reconsider the relation of Heisenberg's notion to Aristotle's and show that it can be explicated in greater specificity than Heisenberg did. This is accomplished through the careful consideration of the role of potentia in physical causation and explanation, and done in order to provide a fuller understanding of this aspect of Heisenberg's approach to quantum mechanics. Most importantly, it is pointed out that Heisenberg's requirement of an external intervention during measurement that disrupts the otherwise independent, natural evolution of the quantum system is in accord with Aristotle's characterization of spontaneous causation. Thus, the need for a teleological understanding of the actualization of potentia, an often assumed requirement that has left this fundamental notion neglected, is seen to be spurious.
This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
Introduction
Werner Heisenberg offered an interpretation of the quantum state vector as the encoding of the potential for the manifest possession of physical properties [1, 2] . By that time, the 1950s, the state vector had for decades been understood to provide probabilities of finding the various possible values of physical variables in a quantum system: A probability-wave interpretation of the quantum wave function had been given by Bohr, Kramers and Slater (BKS) [3, 4] and by Born, who considered its application to individual measurement events, as well as to measurements on ensembles of systems, in the 1920s [5, 6] . Heisenberg viewed his move as a deepening of this, introducing a quantitative version Aristotle's notion of δύναμις (in Latin: potentia) to physics, motivated by the complex vectorial nature of the quantum mechanical state space captured by von Neumann's Hilbert space H and its indirect relation to properties [7] .
The relationship of his potentia to Aristotle's δύναμις was not explicated by Heisenberg in much detail, beyond describing it as that aspect of a system's being which reflects its capacity to be later in a certain physical state, in particular, upon measurement when it is seen manifestly to possess that specific property. Thus, potentiality provides the relationship between the objective state of and the possible measured properties of a physical system. Notably, both notions involve a distinction between the actual possession of a property and the potential to possess it later. Heisenberg accordingly held that the laws of quantum mechanics, which unlike those of classical mechanics apply to atomic-scale systems, 'govern the possible and not the actual' measured physical behaviour of individual systems in time. He viewed the state vector as the precise, mathematical encoding of this potential of the quantum system to possess any observed physical property upon its measurement in the future.
The notion of quantum potentiality was later taken up by other physicists, including Abner Shimony, who articulated it primarily in analyses of quantum measurement as the characterization of a fundamental transformation to be explained by mathematical physics, renaming the corresponding problem 'the problem of actualization of potentialities' for the reason that the exceptional sort of quantum state change taking place during measurement coincides with the transition of potential properties to actual properties according to Heisenberg (see §5). Nonetheless, Shimony and others, contra Heisenberg, ultimately downplayed the connection of quantum potentiality with Aristotle's notion of δύναμις (potentia), offering specific reasons for doing so (see §3). Here, I consider the notion of potentiality in Heisenberg's physics ( § §2 and 6) as a modern, quantitative development of that of Aristotle ( §4), more fully explicating it as such and addressing these arguments, which are shown not to tell against its validity.
Heisenberg's potentia
In his interpretation of the quantum state, Heisenberg distinguished its epistemic and ontological roles, viewing the first as relating primarily to the statistical operator ρ and the second to the state vector |ψ associated with the system Hilbert space H (cf. [1, 2] ). Accordingly, he considered the quantum probabilities derived from them as having both objective and subjective aspects: he took the objective aspect as relating to 'statements about possibilities or better tendencies ("potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy)' of the system itself later to have properties actually, and the subjective aspect as that due solely to a lack of knowledge of system properties [2, p. 53]. 1 He viewed the subjective contribution of these probabilities as negligible in the pure case, that is, where tr ρ 2 = 1 and there is a state vector |ψ in the system Hilbert space H such that ρ = |ψ ψ|, which suffices for the specification of the system state. Thus, in this, the objective case the elements of the set of quantum probabilities {p i (O)} for the outcomes {o i } in a measurement of the observable O are given by 
In classical physics, the fundamental law of motion is generally viewed as representing a form of necessary causation, as in Laplace's statement of the ideal of determinism, extendible in principle even to the universe as a whole. 'We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future' [9] . 3 Heisenberg emphasized that, by contrast, the course of actual quantum physical events is in itself, in general, not necessitated but rather is described at each moment only by probabilities for a set of possible future states, and that 'the possibility or rather the "tendency" towards a course of events possesses itself a kind of realitya certain intermediate level of reality midway between the massive reality of matter and the mental reality of an idea or picture. . .' [11] ; cf. [12] . Accordingly, he saw possibility as fundamental to the quantum mechanical world view: '. . .in modern physics the concept of possibility, that played such a decisive role in Aristotle's philosophy, has moved again into a central place' [7, p. 298] . The quantum 'probability concept is closely related to the concept of possibility, the "potentia" of the natural philosophy of the ancients such as Aristotle; it is, to a certain extent, a transformation of the old "potentia" concept from a qualitative to a quantitative idea' [1, p. 13] whereby 'the mathematical laws of quantum theory can be interpreted as a quantitative framing of this Aristotelian concept of that "Dynamis" or "Potentia"' [7, p. 298] .
For Heisenberg, in the objective case when the system state can be given by a vector |ψ ∈ H, it 'no longer contains features connected with the observer's knowledge. . . it is also completely abstract . . . the representation becomes a part of the description of Nature only by being linked to the question of how real or possible experiments will result', regardless of the dispositions of those observing them [1, p. 26] . He argued, nonetheless, that the combination of measured and measuring systems itself cannot be isolated from the external world since the behaviour of the measuring apparatus must be capable of being registered as something actual. . . if the measuring apparatus is to be used as a measuring instrument at all. . . the connection with the external world is therefore necessary [1, p. 27] , that is, the joint system of measuring apparatus and measured object is not a closed physical system. The actualization of the potentia that occurs upon measurement remains objective in character, that is, it is independent of human subjectivity per se: the transition from the 'possible' to the 'actual' takes place as soon as the interaction between the object and the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration of the result in the mind of the observer [2, pp. 54-55].
Thus, it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e. the transition from the possible to the actual, is absolutely necessary here, and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of the quantum theory [2, p. 137] (emphasis mine), that is, the actualization of any quantum apparatus indicating the outcome as well as that of the quantum object measured both take place upon registration. Thus, Heisenberg makes explicit use of Aristotle's notions of δύναμις (the potential) and its counterpart ενέργ εια (energeia, the actual). , as indicated by his invocation of these concepts, Heisenberg's notion of potentia can be seen both to be consistent with Aristotle's notion and as an extension of it, given an appropriate analysis of Aristotle's theory of causation, such as that provided in §4, as seen in § §5 and 6. First, it is valuable to briefly consider its later mention by other physicists.
Quantum potentiality after Heisenberg
Since its introduction, Heisenberg's interpretation of the quantum state via potentia has been used by some dedicated to the investigation of the foundations of quantum mechanics, including Hans Primas [13] , Abner Shimony [14] , Diderik Aerts [15] and Constantin Piron [16] [17] . 4 Kristian Camilleri has also discounted the relation to Aristotle's notion, seeing potentiality as arising from the need for change of modes of description due to linguistic constraints rather than being ontological [19] .
Shimony made use of the notion of potentia numerous times in his investigations of the foundations of quantum mechanics, but found it valuable mainly as an aid to intuition regarding the behaviour of the quantum realm.
The concept of potentiality, vague though it may be, may help the intuition. For instance, it helps us to understand why symmetry is more important in quantum than in classical physics. (When a vacation is still potential, there may be a high rotational symmetry of directions in which it may be taken, but when one buys a ticket to a destination the symmmetry is broken!) Quantum nonlocality is also illuminated to some extent by the concept of potentiality. Thus, in the singlet state of a pair of fermions, the spin of particle 1 and the spin of particle 2 are strictly correlated with respect to all axes, but that fact is inseparable from the fact that all components of spin are merely potential. [14, p. 309] In Shimony's view, at most, potentia captures the indefiniteness of quantum properties, which are significant in relation to entanglement. About Heisenberg's specific mention of Aristotle's notion of δύναμις (potentia) in his interpretation of quantum mechanics, Shimony argued that
The historical reference should perhaps be dismissed, since quantum mechanical potentiality is completely devoid of teleological significance. What it has in common with Aristotle's conception is the indefinite character of certain properties of the system. However, as shown below, potentia for Aristotle need not always be construed teleologically in physical situations, however much it was so in his biological explanations or in his specific explanations of the effects of heat and gravity.
Shimony finds the connection to Aristotle's notion mainly in what he himself called 'objective indefiniteness' and its relation to changes of a system's properties from indefinite to definite status (and vice versa) upon measurement; for him, Heisenberg's daring choice of the term potentia best reflects the character of properties of a quantum system that they may be indefinite and then later, upon measurement, become definite in value, while others, which were definite, become indefinite. This notion and the term potentiality was used by Shimony in the context of what had been known as the 'quantum measurement problem,' which he thus renamed the 'problem of actualization of potentialities' to emphasize that the change of definiteness of properties takes place upon measurement. Heisenberg wrote most specifically about the relationship among different potentialities, which is captured through the use of Hilbert space, in a discussion of von Weiszäcker's treatment of quantum logic.
. . . if one considers the word 'state' as describing potentiality rather than a reality-one may even simply replace the term 'state' by potentiality-then the concept of coexistent potentialities is quite plausible, since one potentiality may involve overlap with other potentialities. [2, p. 185] Here, 'potentiality' is taken to refer directly to the (complex-valued) quantum state vector rather, than to the (real-valued) quantum probability, where the component of one quantum state |ψ , representing one potentiality, along |φ representing the other, is the 'overlap' φ|ψ . Shimony accordingly also noted the following additional difference between Heisenberg's use of the notion in relation to measurement and Aristotle's use: 'One does not find Aristotle saying. . . that a property becomes indefinite because of observation and that the probabilities of all possible results are well determined. . .', the latter being the means 'whereby the quantum mechanical potentialities acquire a mathematical structure' [20, p. 314] . 5 These differences are discussed in detail and reasons for them are given in §6.
The previous consideration of potentia has failed to consider fully the relationship of quantum potentiality to δύναμις and so prematurely dismissed the significance of Heisenberg's explicit references to it. 6 Although Heisenberg's and Aristotle's notions do differ in some respects, their connection is far more significant than it has been judged to be. 7 After consideration of the pertinent aspects of Aristotle's philosophy of science and a brief discussion of contemporary quantum measurement theory, respectively, in the next two sections, I show how potentiality can be more fully articulated in the quantum context by further consideration of Aristotle's original notion. A more subtle understanding of some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy of physics and the connection between δύναμις and its other elements illuminates the deep connection between Heisenberg's use of the term and the philosophical system from which he drew it. One sees that quantum potentiality has much more in common with δύναμις than capturing the general indefiniteness of properties of the quantum system which, after all, is already captured by Heisenberg via a different notion, Unbestimmtheit (indeterminacy); in particular, it captures the aspect of spontaneous causation involved in quantum measurement.
Aristotle's δύναμις and ενέργ εια
Heisenberg described his application of potentia in quantum mechanics as the quantification, via the squared magnitude of state vector components c i , of the previous, qualitative notion of Aristotle. For Aristotle, δύναμις is that aspect of a thing's being corresponding to its capacity to change, in particular, to become that which it currently is not but could be later. Aristotle considers this potency as present before change, representing a capacity for bringing about change into a possible future state.
. . . all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. He mentions two specific sorts of potency, one which is the general capacity to do something, such as to see, and another which is that of being involved in a process leading to a specific final state; in both cases, a potentiality (δύναμις) may lead to an actuality (ενέργ εια, a 'being at work'). 8 This notion might be thought, therefore, necessarily to involve teleology simply because through it the present state of being may be related to a future state of being possibly distant in time. However, according to Aristotle, future states are not necessarily reached according to inherent natures, but only normally so and when so, can even be immediately reached. Indeed, a spontaneous, external intervention may be the primary cause of a future state of being of a previously isolated entity.
Aristotle's philosophy of science involves a number of inter-related doctrines which are interwoven with his conceptions of motion and causation and used to provide explanations (cf. e.g. [24] , pp. 18-21). Those most relevant here are the doctines of substance and accident, matter and form, and potentiality and actuality. For Aristotle, the substance of a thing-which, it should be noted, is not simply identified with its matter-denotes the being of each concrete individual and is prior in significance to its other aspects, such as quality, quantity and place. For him, matter can be either 'prime' or 'informed' (e.g. marble versus a statue made from marble), with form making matter into an individual substance identified with the collection of its essential properties. The nature (φύσ iς ) of a thing is its inherent source of change or lack thereof [26 Aristotle's approach to physics as a specific science is largely rooted in his theory of causation, which involves four inter-related sorts of cause: the material (causa materialis), formal (causa formalis), efficient (causa efficiens) and final (causa finalis). The final cause, when present, is explanatorially primary and cannot be identified or reduced to the other sorts of cause (cf. [29] , p. 185-187). 9 According to Aristotle, in coming to understand nature, the physicist has the task of seeking the causes involved in every situation:
Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the question 'why' in the way proper to his science-the matter, the form, the mover, [and] 'that the sake for which'. The last three often coincide; for the 'what' and 'that for the sake of which' are one, while the primary source of motion is the same in species as these. . ., and so too, in general, are all things which cause movement by being themselves moved. . . [26, Bk II 7, In the event that an entity's natural motion is spontaneously interrupted, any putative final cause would not play a role in the corresponding change.
An important difference between Aristotle's physics (τὰ φυσικά) and modern physics lies in its breadth of application: for him, motion is change in general and refers not only to changes of location in space, but also change of any kind in anything. 10 It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that a thing changes. . . Hence, there are as many types of motion or change as there are meanings of the word 'is'. [ 
motion in space and time is the primary subject of physics. 11 Aristotle's physics has as a basic principle that all that moves is moved by a mover-omne quod movetur ab alio movetur [24, [24, pp. 20-32] ). Potentiality and actuality are involved in motion in the following way.
The solution of the difficulty that is raised about the motion-whether it is in the movableis plain. It is the fulfilment of this potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power of causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable, for it must be the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a mover because it actually does it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. Hence there is a single actuality of both alike. . . [26, Bk. III 3, .
Such joint actualization is naturally reflected in the quantum mechanical context, where it extends beyond locomotion, as discussed in §6. 12 The relationship of final causation to the potential in the case of natural motion is succinctly presented in the following statement from Aristotle's Metaphysics, where δύναμις is most fully analysed: '. . . everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired. . .' [23, Bk. IX 9, 1050a7].
Aristotle holds that explanations in science are found by identifying the causes underlying that which is to be explained. He argues, in his Parts of Animals, that in biology the final cause is of primary significance in providing explanations for the generation of living beings: biological generation can be elegantly explained by invoking its product, for example, in a seed's giving rise to a tree. When distinct and present, the final cause (τέλoς , telos) has explanatorial primacy. However, it may still not have causal primacy; an efficient cause is necessary in all situations (cf. e.g. [30, p. 90] ). Aristotle illustrates this in the physical realm by noting that a lunar eclipse has no final cause [23, Bk. VIII 4, 1044b8-12] . Thus, in situations where there is a final cause, that cause is the (explanatorily) primary cause, whereas when there is no final cause, the efficient cause can be the primary cause and can suffice for explanation. Indeed, Aristotle's account of efficient causes in terms of potentiality and actuality can provide explanations for the material and formal causes, i.e. matter and form [23, Bk. IX, Chs. 1-5]; cf. [25, pp. 21-23] . In such cases, the efficient cause, the sort of cause exclusively favoured by modern physics, is even the sole ground of the explanation of events.
Aristotle's explanations were primarily qualitative in character, something naturally accounted for by the technological state of scientific inquiry of his time. Given the intervening development of the notion of possibility, it was therefore natural for Heisenberg to describe the probabilities used in early quantum mechanics by BKS and Born as providing 'a quantitative version of the old concept of "potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy': The learned approach to possibility had changed by Heisenberg's era to involve the mathematical tool of probability, which had by then been introduced as a notion of 'graded possibility' [31] , specifically by Leibniz in 11 ' The science of nature is concerned with spatial magnitudes and motion and time. . .' [26, Bk. III 4, 30] . 12 Note also that, although Aristotle does subscribe to a version of the theory of natural elements-'the elementary natural bodies-namely, fire, earth, and the like' [26, Bk. IV 1, 208b8]-these elementary natural bodies are to be understood as more pure (but also not self-movers) and different from the samples of fire, earth, etc., of experience. logic and philosophy in the era of early Newtonian physics. 13 Heisenberg realized that quantum measurement events could be studied by making use of this aspect of Aristotelian causation in the context of mathematical physics. Here, after considering the nature of contemporary quantum measurement theory in the next section, the consistency and closeness of the notion of δύναμις of Aristotle and Heisenberg's updated notion of potentia are more fully demonstrated, in §6.
Quantum measurement
In the now standard quantum theory of measurement, the process of measurement and its elements are typically treated as follows (cf. e.g. [33] , p. 28). A system S is initially prepared through a series of physical interactions, such as state filtering, in some well-defined quantum state |η , after which it is measured through interaction with a measurement apparatus. The apparatus A, after beginning in a fiducial initial state |χ 0 , is required to enter a state corresponding to the value of the pointer property Z, 14 which becomes correlated with the value of the measured property (non-degenerate observable) E of S. Thus, both S and A are given an entirely quantum mechanical representation.
For simplicity, let us consider the property to be measured as a discrete quantum observable E = i e i |ψ i ψ i |, where {|ψ i } is an orthonormal basis for the system Hilbert space H corresponding to its eigenvalues {e i }. A minimal additional requirement required of a measurement is that a 'calibration condition' be satisfied, namely, that if a property to be measured is a 'real' one, then it must exhibit its value properly, unambiguously and with certainty; that is, if S is in an eigenstate of E, |ψ k , then the state of A after the interaction between the two is an eigenstate of Z (with eigenbasis {|φ i } associated with pointer readings z i ), which serves to indicate the specific value of E present. 15 Accordingly, for measurable properties represented by Hermitian operators, the calibration condition can be considered in the form of a probability reproducibility condition, namely, that a probability measure E T for a property be 'transcribed' onto that of the corresponding apparatus pointer property, thereby 'objectifying' it. Furthermore, in the above process of registration of the measured property by the measurement apparatus, measurement is assumed to include the reading out of the registered value.
Following this approach, a difficulty, known as the quantum measurement problem, arises: if the initial state of a system is a state |η that is not an eigenstate of E, so that the joint system S+A begins in the state |η |χ 0 , and if the measurement interaction is described only by a unitary operator U and is linear, i.e. does not itself depend on the system state, the unitary time-evolution operator requires that this lead to a joint state that is a non-trivial superposition of joint eigenstates of E and Z having the form
The result, in its full generality, is an absence of strict determination of the pointer observable: the superposition is non-trivial, that is has more than one summand, leaving the outcome of the measurement underdetermined. In general, some sudden state change appears to be required, in addition to any evolution of the type of equation (5.1) that might take place, for the joint state |ψ k |φ k that accurately reflects the state of the joint system after measurement to result. In the light of the discovery of such limitations of the standard quantum theory of measurement and the failure to remove them by a broad range of plausible means (cf. [34] ), Shimony was compelled to evaluatively characterize Heisenberg's move of introducing 13 Heisenberg occasionally changed the referent of the term potentiality; but, from here on, we take it here to refer exclusively to the quantum state (set of probability amplitudes), which is a complex quantity, rather than the quantum probability or the property of the object, as the mathematical representative. This differentiates potentiality from the quantum probability to which it is related through complex squaring; arguments against the propensity interpretation of probability which might be thought to apply to potentiality are rendered ineffective (cf. e.g. [32] ). One thereby retains the ability to consider which potentialities are compatible with any given measurement outcome. 14 The strictness of the (at least implicit) eigenvalue-eigenstate relation varies from interpretation to interpretation. 15 The free-Hamiltonian function contribution to the evolution of the system is considered negligible relative to the effect of the measurement interaction contribution. potentiality as follows. 'Heisenberg has drawn from quantum mechanics a profound and radical metaphysical thesis: that the state of a physical object is a collection of potentialities. But his discovery is incomplete, in that the transition from potentiality to actuality remains mysterious' [20, p. 316 ]. Shimony had hoped that this 'metaphysical question admits of a mathematical answer' [20, p. 315 ] through a sufficiently thorough quantum theory of measurement leading to determinate outcomes. But, because the standard mathematical treatment of measurement foundered in this way, the invocation of potentiality was devalued in his estimation. However, one must remember that Heisenberg sought only to clarify the Copenhagen approach in which the success of such a treatment in this way, i.e. entirely within the quantum formalism, was neither required nor, indeed, expected.
Quantum potentia reconsidered
Contrary to suggestions that Heisenberg's quantum potentiality is far removed from Aristotle's δύναμις (potentia) despite Heisenberg's own explicit association of it with quantum potentiality, these two notions can be seen, in the proper context, to be related to a degree rarely appreciated, that is, by few other than Heisenberg himself. Having recalled the pertinent elements of Aristotle's philosophy of physics and of the formal treatment of quantum measurement, let us now more fully explore how Heisenberg's conception of potentia can be explicated as a quantitative extension of δύναμις, as he suggested.
As noted in §4, this requires mainly concentrating on potentia as discussed in Aristotle's metaphysics and physics, rather than its application to biology and cosmology where he found teleology (involvingέντ ελέχεια, entelechy) essential for explaining various phenomena, such as the growth of organisms and the cosmological order. First, note how in Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg summarized Aristotle's δύναμις in general terms in relation to matter.
. . . in the philosophy of Aristotle, matter was thought of in the relation between form and matter. All that we perceive in the world of phenomena around us is formed matter. Matter is in itself not a reality but only a possibility, a 'potentia'; it exists only by means of form. In the natural process the 'essence,' as Aristotle calls it, passes over from mere possibility through form into actuality. The matter of Aristotle is certainly not a specific matter like water or air, nor is it simply empty space; it is a kind of indefinite corporeal substratum, embodying the possibility of passing over into actuality by means of the form. [2, ch. 9, p. 97] Then, consider that he described quantum probabilities as relating to 'a quantitative version of the old concept of "potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy', to be identified with the quantum state vector, which is 'something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality' [2, p. 4] . Recall also that, as explained in §2, for Heisenberg the actualization of the potentialities taking place upon measurement is ontological rather than epistemic and involves a direct physical intervention from outside the object system, as it was for Aristotle in the case in spontaneous phenomena.
The similarities between the actualization of quantum potentiality in measurement and actualization of δύναμις in Aristotle's philosophy were not extensively exhibited by Heisenberg, whose primary concern was not with the explication of its relation to Aristotelian philosophy per se, but rather with the extent to which the introduction of the notion of potentia and its actualization enables quantum mechanics to remain, like previous successful theories of physics, compatible with realism:
The physicist must, however, postulate in his science that he is studying a world which he himself has not made, and which would be present, essentially unchanged, if he were not there. 
As noted out at the end of §4, final causation can be found, consistently with Aristotle's notions of potentiality/actuality and efficient causation, not to play a primary explanatory role in physics, because for him final causation may coincide with other aspects of causation such as the formal cause or the efficient cause or even to play no role at all, as in the case of a spontaneously caused phenomenon. It is the last to which quantum measurement belongs vis-à-vis the specific outcome obtained. The use in physics of the notion of potentiality and its actualization as an extension of Aristotle's δύναμις should, therefore, not be rejected on the basis that it appears prima facie to conflict necessarily with contemporary constraints on physical explanation that reject τέλoς (telos), especially prohibitions against any sort of causation from the future, as it involves neither. 16 Aristotle's notion of δύναμις (dunamis) is accommodated in the context of quantum mechanics specifically by considering the events occurring at measurement as αύτ oμάτ ως (spontaneous) and primarily efficiently caused, a case considered by Aristotle in his lectures on physics.
Hence it is clear that events which (1) belong to the general class of things that may come to pass for the sake of something, (2) do not come to pass for something that actually results [via telos], and (3) have an external cause, may be described by the phrase 'from spontaneity'. [26, Bk. II 6, ; emphasis mine).
Unlike the nature (φύσ iς , physis) behind 'natural motion,' for Aristotle, spontaneity is an external cause ('. . . spontaneity is an external cause, while nature is an internal cause' [26] , Bk. II 6, 197b32-37) that does not require τέλoς ; cf. [29] , Sect. 4.1. Spontaneous events come about through the interference with natural motion, that is, interference with an object's inherent source of change or rest. Most significantly here, spontaneous events do not occur as the result of fulfilling any inherent purpose, that is, they are inherently non-teleological (not causally involving τέλoς ). Spontaneity is an accidental cause different from any in the object or its per se cause: It is the accidental cause of the spontaneous event (cf. [26] , Bk. II 6, 33 ; cf. [35] , p. 35).
In the present case, actualization occurs in the atomic realm (quantum mechanics), due to the interventions of the apparatus A and system S upon each other's natural evolutions as closed systems. From the Aristotelian perspective, any object, say, an electron (or, in its more contemporary characterization, a localized excitation of the electron field) has a nature with a material cause, for example, its total energy and a formal cause, for example, its combination of rest mass, spin, charge, etc., that characterize its species, however fleeting its existence in actuality may be. Aristotle views physical motions of objects which do not involve external interventions as occurring by virtue of such a nature: 'action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature. . . if nothing interferes' [26, Bk. II 8, , that is, if the system in question is a closed one. In the absence of the external intervention of a measuring instrument, a closed quantum system state evolves in accordance with its nature as just circumscribed, for example, from one moment to the next in accordance with its energy and defining characteristics such as rest mass and charge.
According to quantum mechanics, when not under external influence such as a measurement device, a quantum system in the Hilbert-space state vector |α, t 0 at a time t 0 will later be in the state |α, t 0 ; t at following times t along a continuum such that
where U(t, t 0 ) is unitary (allowing the conservation of quantum probability), Thus, in the case of the natural motion of a quantum system there is, over an infinitesimal amount of time, an evolution described by the unitary, infinitesimal time-evolution operator
which by its continuity property leads to the identity operator as dt goes to zero, where H is the Hamiltonian operator (taken to be Hermitian) which yields with the description of motion by the Schrödinger equation of motion in its differential form ih ∂ ∂t U(t, t 0 ) = HU(t, t 0 ), (6.5) with motion over finite time intervals found by the composition of such evolutions (cf. e.g. [36] , pp. 70-72). Heisenberg held that 'a system cut off from the external world is potential but not actual in character. . .' with an evolution described by 'the transparent clarity of a mathematics whose laws govern the possible. . .' [1] , p. 27, of which equation (6.5) is the prime example. 17 Measurement, by contrast, can be considered a process in which potential being, the potential to be spontaneously actualized by an appropriate external influence, is actualized through accidental efficient causation, rather than by nature (again, with no role for τέλoς or final cause); it is spontaneous motion within the Aristotelian approach to causation. Measurement coincides with an appropriate external interference with the natural motion of a system, preventing the change which would otherwise occur were it to remain isolated, that is, that described by the time evolution of state described by the Schrödinger law of motion (equation (6.5)). Thus, according to Heisenberg's view of the state as 'describing potentiality', the change of state in quantum mechanics is motion in Aristotle's general sense of changes in the set of potential actual properties. In the case of experimental measurements deliberately carried out by a human observer, with the observer-agent seeking an outcome, a spontaneous event takes place with the event of the particular outcome obtained classified as chancy: in Aristotle's treatment, chance spontaneous events (that is, of τύχη) are those spontaneous events that occur where an intention is present; here, the intention would be that of obtaining a measurement outcome. Accordingly, the intention of any observer over and above its act of physically introducing a measurement apparatus adds nothing to the causal explanation of the measurement process, which is, again, in accordance with Heisenberg's views discussed in §2 regarding the role of the subjective aspect of the observer during measurement, which is merely to attend to the recorded outcome of measurement during registration.
Formally, the changes occurring in measurement are changes of measured properties corresponding to the sudden change of the quantum state vector, changes (alteratio) in the qualities potentially possessed. Empirically, these are in accord with the likelihoods of obtaining the range of possible outcomes over an ensemble of measurements of identically preparated systems upon measurement of the corresponding quantum observable in the future. In the case of the quantum measurement as viewed through the formalism of quantum measurement theory discussed in §5, the measured system can be understood as a mover that moves the measuring instrument in the presence of its immediate environment; this complex acts accordingly with respect to values of the quantity to be measured: the 'pointer' quantity of the instrument 'moves' uniquely from the fiducial state |χ 0 to the determinate indicative state |φ k perfectly correlated to 17 The natural motion of a quantum system between measurements is like that of Aristotle's elements that are ever seeking their natural places, according to their natures, but never actually reach them: for him, formed matter may never reach a natural place; in the context of Aristotle's cosmology, this is seen in the case of elemental fire. Aristotle's elemental fire-which, like any element, is never actually observed as pure or in isolation, something Heisenberg also attributed to his quantum potentia, as noted in a passage quoted above-has as its natural place an extreme external boundary of the Aristotelian universe that is never reached by any formed object even though it is part of its substantial nature (cf. [37] , p. 145). For their part, the stars, which are never interfered with, rotate eternally in the heavens about the Earth. the state of the measured system in the process when in contact with the measured system [38] . In the case where the system is itself at the moment of measurement in a state |ψ which happens not to be identical to an eigenstate |η k of the observable which the measurement system is designed to measure, the object system may also be 'moved' by the measurement apparatus, which then is both a 'mover' and a 'thing moved'. The formal description of measurement evolution in terms of both the measuring system and the measured system in quantum theory in general is, therefore, |ψ |χ 0 → |η k |φ k , (6.6) regardless of the initial pure state |ψ of the system to be measured, as required in a successful measurement. The coming together of the system being measured with the measuring system and the environment is the efficient, external and accidental cause of the actualization of the measuring system's (passive) potentia upon measurement as well as that of the measured system, with the result that the object system property and the measurement system pointer property are both actual upon the completion of measurement. 18 The former, when considered as a classical system in interaction with an attending observer, also provides this observer with an experience of a real measurement outcome.
Finally, let us turn to two points regarding the connection between Heisenberg's and Aristotle's notions of potentiality, namely, those of Shimony that 'one does not find Aristotle saying . . . that a property becomes indefinite because of observation and that the probabilities of all possible results are well determined. . .' [20, p. 314] , where the latter is the means 'whereby the quantum mechanical potentialities acquire a mathematical structure'. Regarding the second point raised here, although Aristotle himself did not attribute numerical values or probabilities to potentialities, much less precise ones arising in vector spaces, it was exactly Heisenberg's contribution to suggest this be done to render the notion more precise and befitting the more mathematical character available in its application to modern physics. Heisenberg recognized that such a mathematical character could be given to the fitting notion of potentiality in light of the probability interpretation already present in quantum mechanics as introduced by BKS and Born, as discussed in §1. Rather than merely invoking Aristotle's notion, Heisenberg extended it in a very specific way, in the context of physics, by applying it quantitatively through the use of probabilities corresponding to the range of possible actualizations of measured properties to the squared magnitudes of the components of the system state vector in its Hilbert space, which reflects its nature, in order to produce precise explanations and predictions of atomic-scale phenomena.
Regarding the first point, that Aristotle did not state that a property may become indefinite because of observation (or: measurement), one can see that although it is true that he did not explicitly discuss an example or present a specific rule specifically to make the point that observation or measurement could do so, such a thing is also not ruled out by his approach to causation. Indeed, such a process arises quite naturally if measurement is considered a physical interaction; for example, whenever two different but complementary related qualities are available to a thing and one is actualized, as soon as one which was only possible is actual, then the other is no longer actual but possible in the future. Aristotle does speak, for example, of the phenomenon of colour change in the chameleon, an entity that changes colour with proximity to or as a result of changes in its environment (cf. [39] , Bk. II 11). This change is both a change from a natural state of 'motion' (or rest) and spontaneous: the exhibition of a new colour, which affects the actuality of the previous, natural state of color, is usually merely a potentiality of the chameleon; such an animal's skin can change its appearance from, say, green to brown, rendering its greenness property indefinite, when it incidentally comes into contact with a predator in a brown environment, a situation in which its ongoing natural behaviour such as feeding, during which its colour would have remained green, is interfered with. 19 
Conclusion
Aristotle's powerful philosophical system is very general in its analysis of causation and explanation, allowing for explanations of many kinds of events under a variety of circumstances and is largely independent of the particularities of the now clearly outdated theories of chemistry and cosmology of his era with which it had to contend. Heisenberg's choice of the notion of potentia and his reference to it as part of Aristotle's philosophy is seen in that light to be more well considered than they have been made out to be. The spontaneous actualization of potentiality quantified by quantum probabilities, the notion introduced by Heisenberg, is seen to extend consistently Aristotle's earlier, more qualitative notion of potentia (δύναμις). Most importantly, his use of potentia captures the relationship between the system description and observed phenomena under the circumstances in which the equation of motion for the quantum state alone cannot provide an adequate explanation, in particular, the non-deterministic change of quantum state of a system upon its measurement due to the intervention of the external physical system spontaneously to one of a number of possible states.
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